

February 27, 2007

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Copy: Eileen Hawley, NASA
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Subject: Parting Comments/Observations

I've been asked to give to you all some final observations and thoughts around the work I attempted to do on behalf of Constellation and NASA between August, 2006 and March, 2007. I am happy to do so, but want to warn you that the comments below are not necessarily favorable to either this engagement between the two of us or the evolution of a marketing/communications strategy for Constellation. As you know, I am an independent contractor—and independent in every sense of the word. What you will hear from me will be very direct and honest, uncompromised around my hopefully securing a government/NASA contract, as so many are with whom you interact. And also know that I speak for many in the comments below.

Additionally, I have attached a list of those interviewed in this engagement (August through December, 2006) as well as others interviewed in 2005.

Behavior matters.

As you know, I came into this work enthusiastic and wanting to help. I had worked for three years to get to this point, to work with NASA directly to share with the Agency my marketing experiences, my marketing process (*The Balance Point Process*®) vs. working for NASA through contractors such as Lockheed, Boeing or others in the middle. My first introduction to the aerospace industry was in delivering a seminar on 'Value Proposition and Stakeholder Analysis' around the country to many divisions of Lockheed Martin—and Denver was one of the stops, in 2002. After a few years working with Lockheed on and off, I felt that NASA as an agency should learn how to do this important work and if I could help NASA learn *how* to do this work, that would be the contribution I could make to the hopeful success of The Vision and Constellation, in addition to message and strategy development. It was that simple and through the kind auspices of Mike Coats, I presented the process and some stakeholder findings in June, 2006 to JSC staff.

As I mentioned above, I am not dependent on NASA for my livelihood. I had seen enough posturing for contracts from previous experiences and it didn't appeal to me. In

fact, I viewed my financial independence from NASA through my private sector client base as a positive: as with other clients in the private sector, I could be independent in my work and my analysis, letting the data from the *Balance Point Process* interviews speak for themselves, as they always do. Just to remind you, my marketing process is not about me, but rather about the thoughts and perceptions of stakeholders and segments within a market through interviews: letting the markets speak and *from there*, evolve a strategy. In other words, rely on external perceptions and let the data from the market drive strategy vs. internal assumptions that are almost always erroneous and end up wasting precious time and money. Our value to all clients, including NASA, is to bring the market to them, be up-front with clients around stakeholder perceptions and be independent in terms of recommendations to help clients establish 'value' with their stakeholders/value chains (ala Gore-Tex, which I have shown you).

From June through mid-August, I thought that a good team for this Constellation work had been established—a team to both work *with* me and to allow me to do the work set forth under the contract. Under the contract that Eileen Hawley and others work so hard to secure, I was to bring an honest appraisal of stakeholder perceptions and a marketing/communications strategy that would help sustain Constellation's ability to survive the political landscape over the next 20 to 30 years. That strategy was to be built around 'value': Constellation's 'value' to the nation as a whole and specifically to Constellation's respective stakeholders: within NASA itself, The White House, Congress, Industry, and ultimately and most importantly, to the American taxpayers.

The beginning—almost

The very first meeting on August 17th changed the entire scope of my ability to do what I had been hired to do, what others at JSC wanted me to do, and what Constellation and NASA so badly needed. On August 17th at our first meeting, I was introduced to Marsha Ivins, indicating that I would report to and through her on all matters regarding my contract and though this was another person in the loop, I was fine with this until, in that meeting, it became clear to me that Marsha was the type of person who not only would try to control me, but also impose her own bias into a strategy development process that was to allow external stakeholder perceptions to drive strategy. Her insistence about not wanting me to interview/include Tom Hanks in our work to leverage messages for Constellation "because he is a fake astronaut" was the beginning. What was also clear in that meeting is that Marsha had absolutely no concept of what is involved in developing an appropriate marketing/communications strategy, nor was she familiar with our process or the work we were to perform. It was the equivalent of me flying the shuttle: wrong match.

As the days, then weeks, evolved, it became very clear that our firm's contract and process were at odds with Marsha's own agenda. Having been asked to coordinate my

efforts with Shanna Dale and Eric Sterner, I arranged to meet with Eric in Washington on September 13th. I wanted to meet with Eric to get to know him and establish an open line of communications, as I knew other communications activities were underway with Bob Hopkins (who I knew) from Headquarters and we all wanted to avoid duplication of effort. As well, there were some other clear requests that Eric had of me in this work: coordinate with Hqd., but please don't meet with Congressional staff or members; and also keep Hqd. posted on the number of interviews to be conducted, as there is OMB oversight on the quantity of interviews to be done.

I am not going to go into detail around all of the circumstances of that morning. However, I was quick to deduce that Marsha clearly did not want to work with me, my firm, did not want to understand our process and was, in fact, threatened by our presence. What she had done in Washington was to 'make a mountain out of a mole hill', creating a scenario to make herself powerful/controlling, inserting herself between Eric and me, not allowing me to speak at all to Eric directly around his requests. I was allowed to give a brief presentation on our marketing process to Eric, told what to say, and excused from further conversation. With a contract in place and with no friction at all between me and Eric, Marsha used me like a pawn to posture on the 9th floor, make herself seem powerful, actually telling me that morning: "I just saved your job... This is a good deal for you: you don't have to do nearly as many interviews and still get paid the full contract amount." As I later learned from other sources, in Eric's mind, though clarity was needed around my not going to the Hill, he had no problems with this work or me at all. What Marsha had done was to literally create a 9th floor drama for her self interest—to try to make me beholden to her and to then allow her to control my activity. It didn't work.

Throughout September, I emailed and called to arrange a meeting with her and others in Houston to review past work and to move forward and there was no cooperation, no effort to arrange a meeting in Houston. The damage had been done in Washington, though, as from that meeting on, I had absolutely no respect for or trust in Marsha Ivins. Given the fact that she was the primary contact and integrally involved on Constellation communications strategy, I literally could not do the work under the auspices of someone I viewed as manipulative and untrustworthy. From a personal standpoint, being a professional of high regard for years, I had little time for such insulting and immature behavior. Not only did she demean me, but in person and on the phone, demeaned and insulted many others in the Agency to me, especially those involved with Agency communications strategy.

Why do I bring this up? Why is this important?

The above is important from several standpoints:

1. First of all, it is *inconceivable* to me that any organization would allow someone like Marsha Ivins to behave the way she did with me and to others—and get away with it. No company in the private sector with whom I have worked would allow such arrogance to survive weeks, let alone years. It speaks very, very badly for the culture of NASA and of JSC in particular. When news of this latest astronaut episode occurred, people (including local media) asked me if I knew the astronauts or if I was surprised by this type of behavior. Though I declined media questions out of respect to so many good people at NASA, down deep I really wasn't surprised having seen the types of behaviors I have seen;
2. Second, being unable to trust a team player/direct report precluded me from actually fulfilling my full contract: to work, to interview the value chain, to provide Jeff, Constellation, Mike and NASA an independent and professional appraisal of stakeholder perceptions and resulting strategy recommendations;
3. Thirdly, politics prevailed over taxpayer value. Though Marsha's behavior was known among many, it was allowed and not checked—and the taxpayers lose once again, as there is no meaningful 'value-based' strategy for Constellation. Believe me, creating and airing a television commercial is *not* a strategy. The power of a strategy lies in the fact that precious resources—time and money—are not wasted: the confusion between 'advertising' and 'strategy' still abounds within NASA.

Perception is reality—and a solid opportunity for all of us and especially the taxpayers was lost around this lack of professionalism, political back-stabbing/maneuvering, and immature behavior. Never in my 20 years of working with clients around the world in dozens and dozens of industries have I seen such behavior. It is shameful. Some of you knew it was going on—every detail—and yet it went on unchecked, unaccounted for. Marsha knew full well she had us all in a box: she leveraged and abused her relationship with Dr. Griffin and the 9th floor; Eileen Hawley, my primary POC at NASA and whose husband is an esteemed member of the astronaut corps, could really do nothing, etc., etc. It felt as if Marsha I had been left out to hang to deal with a problem that wasn't mine, but was completely destructive to my efforts at Headquarters and elsewhere. In my view, Marsha abused the privilege of being an astronaut on taxpayer money—and the taxpayers suffered, as needed work was not completed.

As some of you know, from that point on, I was forced to change the focus of my work, going outside to create my own versions of a 'kitchen cabinet' to assist me in securing interviews and moving the project forward as best I could. I did complete many excellent interviews, did deliver to you a strategy that will work and, contrary to Marsha's suggestion, I did not invoice NASA for the full amount of my contract, or even *close* to what I could have under the terms of the contract. In fact, for the time and effort I put into this, I have probably lost money.

I know that I may be perceived as 'just another consultant', disposable, etc. Fine, but one shouldn't judge a book by its cover. I knew what Marsha was up to on August 17th, at our first meeting. I've seen the type before—and have a great B.S. detector. Though she may have viewed me as 'just a consultant' who could be dismissed by her perceived power, she misread me and also the benefit I could have potentially brought to the table and to Marsha herself. I have many friends who work in Washington—on the Hill, The White House and elsewhere—some friends who see the current President and First Lady on a daily basis. I myself worked in The White House under two Presidents, wrote memos directly to Presidents, understand the culture of White House and Washington politics quite well. I'm not an idiot, and Marsha underestimated me. She, alone, alienated me and others through her unprofessional demeanor and immature, destructive behavior. As a result, we all lost.

I want to share with you a quote from a great book, 'Winning Behavior', something I recommend a suggested few read:

“Companies (ala NASA) gain ground when they distinguish themselves in positive ways, and lose ground alarmingly fast when they lose sight of customer (vendor/stakeholder) expectations....Today, you can't win customers through high-quality products or good service alone. Your competitors offer those benefits, too. If you want to outperform them, you've got to *out-behave* them...To make a sale today, and to keep a customer for years, there must be a positive chemistry between buyer and seller. What creates that chemistry is the seller's (NASA) behavior at every stage of interaction with the customer (me, Congress, taxpayers—anyone). The smartest companies use a well-orchestrated array of winning behaviors that raise the bar for competitors and keep customers coming back for more...”—Winning Behavior, David Pugh

Lessons learned—and we move on.

What's really going on: What is NASA's mission? Value?

A great deal has been written about NASA's culture, especially after the loss of the two shuttles. Prior to this engagement, I didn't really didn't understand or *feel* what the words were trying to describe about your culture. I now know. The culture under which you operate is anything but normal, anything but efficient or effective in the areas in which I worked. Early on in this assignment, a friend of mine on the 9th floor at NASA Hqd., when asked about NASA's 'value' and that specifically of The Vision, said: "Basically, NASA is a bureaucracy whose sole mission is to survive as a bureaucracy—and to serve a bunch of pandering, prima-donna Astronauts, to get them to fly."

At the outset of this work, I was a bit taken aback, as I had met some wonderful people at NASA over the years that were truly committed professionals—including Astronauts. But, as I moved through this work, asked dozens and dozens of well-respected people questions related to NASA's relevance and the 'value' of Constellation and The Vision, I see his point: neither Constellation's or The Vision's value has been well defined or stated to me by any interviewee and thus, I have found myself reflecting more and more on his statement. To a large degree, he is correct: the mission of NASA is to protect itself as a bureaucracy. This is what you do every day: protect your jobs and your turf, and by so doing, protect NASA as an agency.

Between Lori Garver and I, we have interviewed over 100 people in person over the past 2-1/2 years, asking staff on Capitol Hill, The White House, staff within NASA, members of the aerospace industry (Boeing, Lockheed, Northrops), students, and taxpayers some fundamentally simple questions about what NASA is currently doing, if they know about The Vision, if they know about Constellation, the 'value' of NASA and Constellation to the nation and to them personally, etc. (Discussion Guide and interviews attached).

No one can give a clear, compelling answer.

No one.

Why?

Because perhaps there isn't one...

—other than vague and esoteric answers like 'Great nations explore', 'It is man's destiny to discover', etc.

This is a problem. In these times—in this era of perceived dysfunction across the entirety of government, in this era of little perceived 'value' from government—those lofty, esoteric answers won't fly. Period. Yes, with some, but not with the majority of citizens.

More than anyone, I have spoken with/met with/focus-grouped more people on this topic ('value') for NASA than anyone alive. NO ONE GETS IT—the 'value' of Constellation—at all—even inside NASA and within the aerospace industry.

Do they want to get it? Yes. Do they want to see the value of Constellation and NASA? Yes.

They want to believe in something, in what NASA is doing. They want to believe especially in something the government does. But they can't because you don't let them. Because of a true lack of leadership and understanding of this issue from the top, because of the incredible politics within PAO and other areas agency-wide, because you are...well...a bureaucracy that moves slowly, protects turf, is insulated from reality, because there are people in charge of this area who have no clue what to do or even see the dire need to do something—because of these and other reasons, you (NASA) can't give a straight, clear answer around the 'value' to the nation and taxpayers of going back to the Moon and then onto Mars.

You can't answer the question: 'Why are we doing this?'—this one, simple question that comes up all the time with those outside of your small, insular world. And your contractor friends who always have their hands out for the next contract and don't want to ruffle your feathers can't answer the question either because, in reality, they, like you, haven't thought of it because they, like you, have government money to protect them, to pay for their salaries. They, like you, are a bureaucracy—part of yours, in fact—that needs to exist, and you feed them.

Value. If you work for NASA or one of the contractors, why do you have to think of value? In a shocking email to me last month, a JSC NASA staffer wrote, about NASA having 'value' to taxpayers: "It is good once in a while for an organization to stop and ponder what its purpose is...As you know, though, the government does not always need a market." In other words, the government (NASA) doesn't always need to be accountable to a market—to have 'value' to stakeholders—like my other private sector clients. Go figure. That's the mentality we're dealing with here. Why do we have to explain ourselves? There are no market forces at play here—to make us lean, efficient, to provide value in order to survive.

Here's another example of how far out of alignment NASA is with stakeholders. Linda, my wife, and I went to the December 9th launch of STA-116, thanks to Greg Hayes putting us on the VIP list prior to his retirement. I went for many reasons, the most important one in that I am such a fan and wanted to see a launch. I also went because I viewed the launch setting as a 'fab': I could ask the other VIP guests questions I would ask any interviewee.

As we rode out to the viewing area on December 7th, after Mike Coats' great talk/briefing; there was a guide named Eric who explained to us what we would go through, see, etc. As he spoke, he referred to 'the moon and beyond, onto Mars', used the words 'The Vision', used the word 'Constellation', ISS, etc. He did this without hesitating, thinking he was 'communicating' with the VIP guests. He spoke about STS-116 going to ISS, etc.

So, being the marketing geek that I am, I asked these other VIP folks—NASA's front-line of supporters, one would assume—if they understood the above words, knew what The Vision was, knew what Constellation was, knew anything about ISS, etc. Reaction? Blank, for the most part—and these are your big 'supporters', people who, like Linda and me, invested time and money to watch a launch. To a person (about 30 or so), they had NO IDEA what our bus guide Eric was talking about (The Vision, Constellation, etc.) People actually asked/told me: "What is ISS for, anyway? Well, there's a waste of money... Other than putting on these panels, what *is* it for, anyway? We're supposedly going to ISS to keep our International agreements. Why not just pay off the other governments and move onto something else?" That's what I heard. And, by the way, what *is* it supposed to do for us, the taxpayers of the U.S., other than keep our word with other countries? What *is* the value—the return—for ISS? Read the Call Report attached from the EDS/EADS gentlemen I interviewed in Paris in December—and you'll get a different take.

Dr. Griffin, in an interview the Saturday afternoon of the launch, topped it all off. We were sitting in our hotel room and Fox TV came on and said that they were going to interview Dr. Griffin at Kennedy Space Center. Naturally, I wanted to watch—and did. The commentator, Keith Someone, talked about the delay, the impending launch, and then asked Dr. Griffin the \$100 billion question: 'Why is it that we are going back to the moon?' I was on the edge of my seat, perched like a cat to leap with joy to what I was sure to be a solid answer that would resonate with the public. Instead, Dr. Griffin gave the *most* obscure answer to such a simple, damn question...rambling on about how having a base on the Moon is analogous to the U.S. having a base in Antarctica. COMPLETELY blew it. Could not have been more confusing, more obscure, more of a wasted opportunity. Linda actually said: "What the hell does that have with going back to the Moon?" Yea, that answer really moved the 'value'/'relevance' thing ahead. Linda and I just sat there, dumbfounded. Who in the world gives Dr. Griffin talking points???? I was so bewildered that I ordered a DVD of the interview just so I could make sure he missed the mark by as much as he could—and sure enough, he did. I know he's a good guy. I know he's a great engineer. It was also clear in that interview that he and his 9th floor staff don't believe this topic of relevance/value/generating is very important. What a wasted opportunity.

Which brings me back to the quote from the 9th floor of NASA Hqd.: perhaps Constellation's real, tangible value for the VIP'ers at STS-116, those I focus-grouped, the over 100 people interviewed to date *really doesn't exist*, and thus the value really lies in just keeping the bureaucracy alive, fed, and trying to find something for the Astronauts to do. If you (NASA) and the many others interviewed can't explain your value clearly, then *just maybe* 'value' for Constellation doesn't exist *to the degree that key stakeholders and the American public can comprehend*. A clear set of values hasn't happened yet—and I don't see anything going on that will allow it to happen in time to avert the next President to possibly scuttle the whole thing, given this era in which we live. In fact, Newt Gingrich is already on this page, if you haven't noticed—and others may be soon, unless you get your act together:

“NASA is an aging, unimaginative, bureaucracy committed to over-engineering and risk-avoidance...”—Newt

3. The most important audience of all to capture for Constellation and for NASA is the American business community. I've talked to Bob H. about this several times. What NASA/Constellation needs to do NOW is to get involved with key business leaders and business around the country in key disciplines such as medicine, materials, electronics, energy—and explain to them what you're trying to do, work with them to develop solutions to potential problems, and engage them. From there, spread out to other key businesses and business leaders and key and top business schools and teaching universities.

At the end of the day, folks, this entire effort—this entire thing, what ever it turns out to be—is about money. If it isn't, it should be. How simple would it be for Dr. Griffin and everyone else involved to just say: "The Vision and Constellation are all about money: about new technologies, new economies that will manifest themselves here in our own earthly economic infrastructure, creating jobs, bla, bla, bla..." It is about money, just as the great explorations of centuries past were about trade routes, search for gold, land claims—money.

And, because it is about money, it is about business. 'Sustainability' should be almost exclusively around 'financial sustainability' for American business to partner with you. If you can bring them in now and build a sustainable business partnership/outreach with key and influential business in America, you will have a sustainable program. If not, you'll most likely fizzle and/or be irrelevant, just like you are now. Get American business engaged—and guess who works in business across America? Young adults. Cool. Also, adults who aren't young work in businesses, too. Taxpayers: that's who works in business and who should be your only 'primary target'.

4. Bob's work cites the studies of several of us who contributed, including The Unland Company's focus groups. I can tell you that neither he nor his agency (Via Novo) listened to more than 20 minutes of those focus groups—and if they did, they missed the key and essential points made by the good taxpayers who participated from New York, Chicago, and San Diego—and the high school students as well. Oh, they'll say they listened to all of them, but I can tell by the unchanged output of the Jan. 24th version that they didn't. Typical, as it takes time to listen and learn. How do I know? No where in the document does it address the key and essential questions raised in every focus group: Why are we going back to the moon? And, what is the value of this (The Vision) to us and to the nation? Still dodging the bullet. Still doing the typical bureaucratic, PowerPoint, dummied-down, risk-averse approach to nowhere. And, again, driven by the same internal crowd of 80+ NASA PAO staff who have gotten you to this point: nowhere.

Bob's effort, as well intentioned as it is, will probably go nowhere and get you nowhere. What it allows is for you, at the NASA Center level, to do what you think is best—which is to say that it allows you not to change. Not just you at JSC, but agency-wide. Though Bob's effort gives you guidance, it allows you to keep your job and to be as risk-averse as you want to be in a culture where politics and protecting turf rule. It is a great cover for the disincentive to change.

Bob Hopkins is a good person. He is trying, but he is still caught in the internal web of NASA's and the industry's current paradigms.

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You have a strategy for Constellation from me—and it is still the best one out there. Use it.

In spite of all the hocus pocus and wasted time at the beginning of this project, I did provide you with a strategy for Constellation: a strategy, not a tactic or an ad. A strategy. It has been passed around to key players at JSC, at Marshall, at HQ, and among top industry people. It isn't perfect, but it is extremely well received, even by critics of The Vision and Constellation. Some even call it 'brilliant in its simplicity'.

Why is it a good strategy? Because it would force you to be relevant to stakeholders: to lay out for us all the 'value' of this plan in terms of *your best hopes* around advances in medicine, energy, etc.—and to give us concrete value propositions for being on the Moon—which then answers the question raised by those few hundred million of us not in the space industry: *Why are we going back to the moon?* Listen to the strategy again—and if you need another CD of it, tell me and I'll send it to you. Take the time to listen—again and again. I have, looking for holes, but there aren't many. Why? It is formed not on a whim or on an internal assumption (like a TV commercial), but is crafted from listening to stakeholders at NASA. The Hill, industry, and most importantly students and adults who participated in the focus groups. It will work, if you move the barriers out of the way and let it work.

What you (Constellation/NASA) need is 'Public Intake', not 'Public Outreach'

So, generally, here's who you communicate with and how: The AIAA, the Space Foundation, The Coalition for Space Exploration, Space News, and a few others. Elliot Pulham (great guy) and The Space Foundation has his annual event at The Broadmoor in May. Solicits 'white papers' for an array of topics a which few write and even fewer read. People from industry attend—largely from money you (NASA) have given them for contracts to do things, including come to the come to The Broadmoor, I guess. More of these around the nation as the year progresses to keep the revenue and membership up.

General Dickman of the AIAA (though not acknowledging it, but in direct competition with The Space Foundation) holds several big events every year like the one they held in San Jose in September around 'The Value Proposition of Space'. Solicits 'white papers' (certainly the good folks in Peoria, Illinois know what a 'white paper' is, especially relative to a 'newspaper'), a few write them and even fewer read them. Oh yes: people from industry attend—largely from money you (NASA) have given them for contracts to do things, including come to the come to San Jose, I guess

Oh, then it's Boeing's turn to hold the Second Conference on Space Exploration, this time not in Disneyland (damn), but in Houston. With NASA money that NASA gives them to do things, Boeing, along with Lockheed and a few others in the 'Coalition', spend several hundreds of thousands of dollars to do what? To have a conference with breakout rooms, coffee, and yes...people from industry attend—largely from money you (NASA) have given them for contracts to do things, including come to the come to Houston, I guess.

Then, after these industry events, its back to the Beltway where the Coalition has a PR lunch on Tuesday, have to go to a reception at the Air and Space Museum with everyone we just saw in San Jose, Houston, The Broadmoor, or where ever. On and on and on and on.

I've never seen an industry talk to itself more—and do so little to move itself ahead—than the aerospace industry.

Having been to several of these—even spoken and presented at a few—I definitely recognize almost everyone who attends and know exactly when the coffee breaks occur. The most fun I had at any of them was talking with Popsicle, the shoeshine guy at the Houston Conference Center who actually had a sense of reality about him. Popsicle asked me what the conference was on, and I said: 'The Vision for Space Exploration' and he said: "What's that?" I told him, focusing on Constellation. Guess what he said? "Why are we going back to the moon?" I told him that after interviewing around 100 top people in

the space industry and spending some of his hard-earned money that I had no idea. No dummy there, that Popsicle.

You get the point. By design and over time, you're insulated from reality, from the people who pay your salaries, from the people who will *definitely* ask you the hard questions like Popsicle's 'Why?' question and those on the focus group DVD clips. You've insulated yourselves for a bundle of reasons—perhaps out of fear, out of arrogance, even out of ignorance. You're so insulated that you've become irrelevant in the minds of your fellow citizens. The big Eureka to me over the past three or four years working in this realm: that you (NASA/the aerospace community/industry) think this world of white papers and conferences and endless studies and endless money from NASA is *real* and that you really don't have to prove your value, to be accountable to a market (taxpayers). As a famous movie line goes: "Prepare yourself, Bridget".

If you'll grant me the assumption that I'm not an idiot, you'd better prepare yourselves for the tough questions around The Vision, Constellation, and even relevance of NASA itself. Find reasons why this politically high-risk program (Constellation) has merit in these very uneasy political times where dysfunction of government is perceived to be rampant and 'value' of government questioned at all levels.

All of the issues discussed above—all of them—are symptomatic of the fact that you are really not held accountable in any real way to anyone. Oh, yes, to a few Congressmen/women and their staffs. I've met them all—good folks with an agenda to keep jobs in the districts and for you not to embarrass them. I recall as well a quote on the 9th floor of NASA Hqd. by a very senior person: "We've got to get this messaging and strategy thing right around Constellation and The Vision. We're tired of being a 'one-vote Agency' where our funding is dependent upon one or two hopeful votes." What a way to live and it isn't as though there aren't ways to overcome this; it's that your internal political-centric culture won't allow it.

There's a reason you are a 'one vote agency' and that NASA has no perceived real relevance to the few hundred million of us who pay your way: you never are in front of us for us to ask you the tough questions, to question the integrity and the value and the relevance of your many programs, to ask what we as taxpayers want or value, etc. You are never really in front of us for us to ask you the tough questions—and for you to answer the questions, to take the heat, and to allow taxpayers the opportunity to *mold* what you do so that you the have 'value' and can *thus* sustain your bureaucracy, the programs that count, and your jobs. Contrary to your associate at JSC who doesn't believe that government "does not always need a market", you do. That's what markets and market forces do do: mold you to be relevant, to have value so that you can continue,

so that you can exist. Overall, you aren't in front of the general tax-paying public, at least not outside of grade school classrooms.

Rather than you doing 'public outreach', you (NASA/Constellation) need **'public intake'**. You—Constellation and NASA—need to be out every month addressing taxpayers and hearing directly from them, understanding your relevance to them *in context* of everything else they have going on or perceive to be going on.

The idea: Space Exploration Symposia to be held around the nation

- These Symposia would be day-long events whose primary objective is for NASA to explain Constellation, show the value of space exploration, and most importantly, communicate this value through local newspaper, television, and radio coverage in each market in which the Symposia are held
- These events would be designed to benefit all of the key Stakeholders involved with Constellation: NASA, The White House, key Members of Congress, the business community, medical and scientific communities, the aerospace industry, the American taxpayers, and others
- The importance of media coverage cannot be overstated, as driving awareness around 'value' leads to engagement which leads to conversion and possible action (writing Congress, etc.)
- The initial thinking is to hold the Exploration Symposia in markets/districts where Congressional support for NASA and Constellation is currently vital—or could be gained
- Once these markets/districts are covered, the strategy is to then branch to larger markets
- The events themselves could be held at a local college/university and could involve the support of the local business community (Rotary Clubs, Chamber of Commerce, etc.), the local scientific and medical community, schools/ the educational community, and others
- In addition, tie in universities: business schools, engineering schools in design and business case competitions
- Officials from NASA, The White House, Congress industry and others would attend and be available for media interviews which will be organized in advance
- Sponsors and co-sponsors could include any number of local and national organizations
- Cities with contained media markets to consider are:
 - Orlando Florida (Center media market)
 - Huntsville, Alabama (Center media market)
 - South Mississippi (Center media market)
 - Houston, Texas (Center media market)
 - Pasadena, California (Center media market)

- Cleveland, Ohio (Center media market)
 - Portland, Oregon
 - San Francisco, California
 - Denver, Colorado
 - Dallas, Texas
 - Oklahoma city, Oklahoma
 - Kansas City, Mo./Kansas
 - Peoria, Illinois
 - Madison, Wisconsin
 - Boston, Mass.
 - New York, New York
 - Philadelphia, Pa.
- Of paramount importance would be to connect participants to Constellation after the Symposiums through continued communication
 - Developing and maintaining a current, yet digestible, web site is important
 - An area of need is for NASA to gain much needed national media exposure to generate awareness of Constellation and its value. As part of this overall program, a media plan needs to be developed to include interviews with leading magazines, newspapers, radio programs, television, etc.

Stop studying all of this nonsense and get out in the firing line. Just do it. There are a thousand reasons why you believe you can't or others, like lawyers, say you shouldn't. Just do it. Face the music—and learn how to lead.

That's it. I'm finished. It would have been nice if this had been a good experience at some level, but it wasn't. I do thank those of you who tried and understand fully why you couldn't intervene and I hold no hard feelings. I believe that I have fulfilled my obligation to you in Call Reports, a strategy on CD, meetings, and this note. And, again—I did not take advantage of the funds available to me via contract: I spent probably 1/3 to 1/4 of what was budgeted.

As you know, you all are very lucky to be working with Mike Coats.